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Rebellion and Mutiny in the Mariana Islands, 1680-1690* 
 
Abstract: The fledgling Spanish colony in the Marianas was rocked by seven episodes of mutiny in 
the 1680s, culminating in the successful takeover of the island of Guam in 1688 by a group of 
mutineers led by a convict captain. In the context of ongoing campaigns of indigenous resistance to 
Spanish colonisation, the actions of these mutinous soldiers placed the project of empire building in 
the Marianas in serious peril. The events surrounding these mutinies have often been underplayed 
within a historiography that focuses on the violent nature of the Spanish presence in the Marianas. 
Nevertheless, the soldiers’ mutinies of the 1680s add another perspective to this turbulent history. 
The experience of mutiny raises considerable questions about the nature of loyalty amongst the 
ordinary soldiers to the project of empire building the Pacific. It demonstrates that Spanish soldiers – 
and often their Filipino counterparts – had the capacity to destabilise the imperial project from 
within. 
 
 
At seven in the morning on 12 September 1690, nine mutineers were lined up on the beach at 
Hagatna, Guam, with their backs to coconut trees, and shot with arquebuses. These soldiers had 
arrived by chance in the Mariana Islands four months earlier when their ship had been wrecked on a 
reef close to the island of Guam. All of them were convicts sent from Mexico to serve a sentence of 
forced military conscription in the Philippines. Accused of conspiring with the intention to kill the 
royal and religious officials on Guam and to seize a ship and sail for Peru, they joined fourteen of 
their comrades whose blood stained the sands of Hagatna’s beach over three days that September. 
These twenty-three deaths violently brought to a close a decade of mutiny in the tiny Spanish 
outpost in the Pacific. In recounting the events to their superiors in Madrid and Rome, the Jesuit 
friars attending to the souls of these mutineers noted that, as the last one fell, there was a sudden 
change of wind, marking the end of the monsoon and the beginning of the prosperous trade winds 
that would carry the supply ships to the islands from Manila. This change of wind was followed by a 
celebration within the Spanish missionary population that marked the end of an era of sedition.1 
 
The history of the early Spanish settlement of the Mariana Islands is widely understood as a 
turbulent time of turmoil and resistance to Spanish colonisation by the indigenous Chamorro 
inhabitants of the islands, which began almost immediately after the arrival of Jesuit missionaries in 
1668. Several decades of resistance and brutal pacification ensued before the islands were finally 
                                                             
*
 Acknowledgments: This paper has benefited from the helpful comments of A/Prof. Michael McDonnell, Dr. 
Sujit Sivasundaram, Dr. John Gagné, and Karol Florek, as well as the thoughtful feedback of the reviewers and 
editors at the Journal of Pacific History. The research undertaken in the Micronesian Area Research Center was 
generously supported by the Paul Bourke Postgraduate Travel Fellowship from the Australia and New Zealand 
American Studies Association, and also made possible by the helpful guidance around MARC by Dr. Omaira 
Brunal-Perry.  
1
 Micronesian Area Research Center (MARC hereinafter), Real Academia de la Historia (RAH hereinafter), 
Cortes 567, Legajo 12: ‘Estado de las Marianas en la Milicia por Diego de Zarzossa y Lorenzo Bustillo, S.J.’ 
Archivo General de Indias (AGI hereinafter), Ultramar, Legajo 562. 
2 
 
brought under nominal Spanish control in 1696. Within this history of rebellion and resistance, the 
role of ordinary soldiers has often been reduced to one of mere conquistador – the brutal and 
unthinking agents of empire in the Spanish Pacific. This article proposes to re-examine the early 
colonial history of the Marianas from the perspective of these agents of empire. I focus in particular 
on the decade 1680-1690 during which five separate moments of mutiny took place amongst the 
soldiers stationed in Guam. Despite taking place in the midst of ongoing indigenous resistance to 
Spanish colonisation, these mutinies have largely been ignored or downplayed in the existing 
historiography. Where the soldiers’ mutinies have been mentioned in accounts of the early colony in 
Guam, they have usually been tacked on as a post-script to the narrative of the indigenous uprising,2 
or placed within a longer narrative of political corruption amongst the islands governors.3  
 
The soldiers’ mutinies within the Guam garrison during the 1680s are nonetheless extraordinary 
examples of how ordinary soldiers could influence the course of imperial expansion in the early 
modern Pacific.  As was the case elsewhere in the Spanish Pacific, the soldiers who served in the 
Marianas were a rag-tag mix of indigenous Filipinos, Mexican mestizos and Spanish convicts, many 
of whom served in some degree of unfreedom. The experience of mutiny raises considerable 
questions about the nature of loyalty amongst these ordinary soldiers to the project of empire 
building in the Pacific. It demonstrates that Spanish soldiers – and often their Filipino counterparts – 
had the capacity to destabilise the imperial project from within. 
 
During the seventeenth century, Spanish power in the Pacific was concentrated within the Philippine 
islands of Luzon and the Visayas, which were administratively controlled by and reliant on the 
viceroyalty of New Spain, in present-day Mexico. The Spanish crown utilised this base to engage in 
projects of domination and wars of attempted conquest across South East Asia and the Pacific, in 
Muslim controlled Mindanao and the Sulu Sea, the spice islands of Ternate and Tidore in the 
Moluccas, the Marianas, and in Taiwan. The establishment of the Marianas mission in 1668 was also 
the catalyst for a new era of exploration and discovery of many smaller islands throughout the 
Pacific, including the Caroline Islands and the Austral Islands, which the some Spanish believed 
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would bring them closer to discovering the rumoured Terra Australis.4 Soldiers were present 
throughout all of these projects of exploration and conquest. Yet, our understanding of who these 
soldiers were and what motivated them is rudimentary. Historians of the Philippines have often 
assumed that soldiers’ interests were intertwined with those of their King and their military 
commanders, drawing on the infamous and often stereotyped image of the Spanish conquistadors 
who conquered the territories of New Spain and Peru and were richly rewarded with land and 
treasure for their efforts.5 This image has never been adequately interrogated within Philippine 
historiography. Even the relatively well-studied history of the early colony on Guam exhibits this 
same bias, with historians emphasising the conflict between ordinary soldiers and 
ChamorrosChamorro Chamorro without analysing the conditions of exploitation and discontent 
experienced by these same soldiers. Many accounts either pass over or simply fail to mention the 
series of mutinies that coincided with indigenous resistance.6 By contrast, the following discussion 
argues that soldiers’ loyalty to the colonial project could not be presumed, despite the fact that the 
loyalty of soldiers was vital for the success of Spanish expansion.  
 
Although the events in Guam in the 1680s are somewhat extraordinary for their extent and scale, 
they reflect a broader experience of rebelliousness amongst soldiers stationed across the Spanish 
Pacific. The majority of soldiers serving in the Pacific were recruited in New Spain; however viceregal 
authorities in New Spain consistently struggled to find sufficient volunteers willing to make the 
Pacific crossing and consequently relied heavily on both formal and informal methods of coerced 
recruitment to fill the needed quotas.7 Thus, from the very outset loyalty amongst Spanish soldiers 
in the Philippines was problematic, since so many found themselves transported across the Pacific 
against their will. The conditions experienced within Spain’s Pacific presidios8 were also catalysts for 
disaffection. Spanish soldiers were subject to exploitation, deprivation, disease and endemic danger 
from being surrounded by hostile neighbours both internally and externally to the archipelago. 
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Moreover, soldiers were rarely ever paid and many found themselves serving in presidios where the 
hope of rotation or relief from duty was non-existent. Thus, soldiers rebelled against conditions of 
isolation and deprivation common to Pacific presidios. While many chose the individual act of 
desertion, mutiny became a collective response to the expectation that they would simply, in the 
words of the Philippine Governor Manrique de Lara, ‘resign themselves to death from a life of 
fatigue without resources.’9  
 
Charting the presence of mutiny in the Spanish Pacific is nonetheless not an easy undertaking and 
the full extent of mutiny among Spanish soldiers stationed in the Pacific in the seventeenth century 
is as yet unknown. Moreover, with some notable exceptions, the details surrounding soldiers’ 
mutinies are patchy.  We do not have, for instance, criminal records that might give us an insight 
into the motivations of those engaging in mutiny. Most known instances of mutiny took place in 
remote presidios where due process was not followed and legal records were not kept. In some 
cases, soldiers were summarily executed before word of the mutiny could be reported to royal 
officials in Manila, let alone to the Council of Indies in Madrid.  Mostly, mutinies are mentioned only 
in passing and without detail, buried within letters or other administrative records. The exceptions 
to all of this are the mutinies that took place in the Mariana Islands between 1684 and 1690. 
Detailed letters kept by the Jesuit missionaries make it possible for the researcher to piece together 
the events surrounding these mutinies in great detail. These events thus make an interesting case 
study for historians not only of Micronesia but also of the broader Spanish presence in the 
seventeenth century Pacific. 
 
By focussing on the contested nature of loyalty among Spanish soldiers, this article emphasises the 
dynamic and fluid nature of colonial interactions on the frontier, bringing to life hidden narratives of 
contestation and negotiation between colonisers and colonial subjects. For some time now, 
historians of the Americas have noted the exceptional nature of colonial frontiers as sites of 
contestation, conflict and interaction.10 Guy and Sheridan define the frontier regions of North and 
South America as ‘contested ground,’ as zones where imperial power was tenuous. They see 
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frontiers as areas of both volatility and vitality, prone to violence and confrontation but also as sites 
of negotiation where imperial cultures could be both resisted and adapted.11 Similar conclusions can 
be made about the distant frontier of the Spanish Pacific. On the frontiers, the process of 
consolidating Spanish control was subject to resistance, violence and warfare – themes that are 
downplayed in a literature that seeks to examine the progressive dominance of Spanish imperialism 
against a backdrop of indigenous passivity.12 Thus by studying the narrative of events on the colonial 
frontier of the Spanish Pacific, we challenge the inherent assumption of a quiet and complicit 
progression towards imperial domination. Ultimately, this article concludes that at particular 
moments, there were many more similarities in experience that united Spanish soldiers with 
indigenous communities than has previously been acknowledged, giving us a glimpse into new 
identities and solidarities that could emerge at moments of disruption and struggle. 
 
This study draws predominantly on archival material contained within the Micronesian Area 
Research Center in Guam and the Archivo General de Indias in Spain. The types of sources under 
consideration include letters and reports written by the Jesuit missionaries, correspondence 
between the governors of the Marianas and the Philippines, the viceroy of New Spain and the King 
of Spain, criminal records, royal decrees, ships' records and other administrative documents.  An 
analysis of these archival materials allows for a fresh examination of the role that ordinary soldiers 
played in the project of conquest and colonisation in the Mariana Islands. The article begins with a 
brief overview of the history of the Spanish presence in the Mariana Islands prior to the 1680s, 
focussing on how the scale of indigenous resistance forced the Jesuit mission to shift from being a 
largely peaceful undertaking to relying on military protection for its survival. The remaining two 
sections focus on the specific case study of mutiny in Guam between 1684 and 1688, seeking in 
particular to examine the origins and motivations of the rebellions that took place. These mutinies 
represent moments when the Spanish imperial project in the Pacific was effectively disrupted, 
demonstrating that resistance to empire was not exclusive to indigenous peoples. 
 
 
Spanish Soldiers in the Colonisation of the Mariana Islands 
First charted by Magellan in 1521, the Mariana Islands had a long history of contact with the Spanish 
after 1565. As the first group of islands encountered during the lengthy voyage across the Pacific, 
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the Marianas were a regular stopover point for the Spanish galleons bound for Manila throughout 
the seventeenth century. They provided an opportunity for the Spanish to take on fresh water while 
trading iron goods such as nails with the indigenous ChamorrosChamorro in exchange for supplies.13 
Iron was such a valuable commodity within the Marianas that each year ChamorrosChamorro would 
sail out in hundreds of canoes to greet the arrival of the galleons and eagerly engage in trade.14 
Throughout these encounters, the ChamorrosChamorro were seen as peaceful and receptive 
towards their Spanish guests. The experiences of survivors who washed ashore in the islands after 
two notorious shipwrecks in 1601 and 1638 were somewhat more mixed. On both occasions some 
of the survivors were killed by the ChamorrosChamorro, yet many others were accepted into the 
community and some remained there permanently.15 Survivors of the 1638 wreck of the Concepción 
were found to still be living on Guam and Rota when the Jesuits arrived in 1668, and at least one of 
these survivors was instrumental in acting as a translator for the missionaries.16 
 
The perceived amiability and receptiveness of the ChamorrosChamorro to Spanish people was a 
clear factor behind the Jesuit plan to establish a mission in the archipelago in 1668. The original plan 
conceived of the Spanish colony in the Marianas as a project of settlement rather than military 
occupation.17 While the mission was supported militarily, the soldiers that accompanied the Jesuits 
were initially thought of mostly as settlers.18 The majority of soldiers that accompanied the Jesuit 
priest Fray Sanvitores in 1668 were Filipinos, who were sent with the intention of providing an 
example of Christian living to the ChamorrosChamorro, while also educating them in matters of 
farming and weaving.19 Other Filipinos were also employed within the missionary work as 
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catechists.20 As the mission became more established, a significant number of soldiers – both 
Spanish and Filipino – took Chamorro women as their wives and were accepted into the colony by 
the Jesuits as permanent settlers.21 In this manner, soldiers married to local wives were entrusted 
with the responsibility of establishing a viable Spanish community within the islands.22 
 
Nevertheless, the presumed receptiveness of the ChamorrosChamorro to Christian conversion and 
Spanish colonisation proved to be little more than a romantic notion and the early idealism of the 
Jesuit missionaries was quickly shattered. The first violent attacks against the Spaniards occurred 
just six weeks after their arrival and in response to a number ChamorrosChamorro dying after being 
baptised with holy water, which they thought the Spanish were poisoning. In 1669, a missionary was 
murdered during an evangelising mission through islands north of Saipan. In the same year, soldiers 
were mustered for the first time to defend Spanish missionaries on the island of Tinian against 
warring Chamorro factions. Throughout the 1670s, low-level conflict was continuous within the 
island chain and especially on the islands of Saipan and Tinian. Missionaries were murdered on a 
regular basis – the most famous of which was the murder of Fray Sanvitores, the founder of the 
mission, in April 1672. On two occasions this low-level violence erupted into full-scale uprisings. In 
1671, two thousand Chamorro warriors attacked the Spanish fort in Hagatna, armed with slingshots 
and flaming spears. The siege was ended by the appearance of a huge typhoon that wiped out 
almost all of the houses on the island but left the Spanish defences relatively intact.23 In September 
1676 another major rebellion war broke out. Seven soldiers were killed in the initial skirmish and the 
war was said to last for seven months.24 The following year, the Spanish received military 
reinforcements which allowed them to undertake an aggressive offensive against the resisting 
ChamorrosChamorro, tearing down houses, burning food stores and killing anyone showing any 
open hostility. By 1680, more than a decade of Chamorro resistance violence had led the Spanish to 
adopt increasingly aggressive measures to consolidate their control over the islands.25 
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The increasing scale of Chamorro resistance to Spanish colonisation during the 1670s impelled the 
rapid expansion of the Guam garrison. While in 1679 there were 40 soldiers stationed in Guam,26 by 
1680 this number had increased to 130 soldiers from Spain, New Spain and the Philippines.27 For the 
most part, soldiers were recruited in New Spain as part of the yearly levies for the Philippines, and 
arrived in the Marianas on board the galleons sailing from Acapulco towards Manila. The length of 
the Pacific voyage and the known dangers associated with serving in the wild and tropical climate of 
the Philippines proved a consistent disincentive for most career soldiers to enlist voluntarily. 
Consequently, the Philippine levies were beset with corruption and relied heavily on legal convictism 
as well as unscrupulous methods of forced conscription.28 Thus, a large number of soldiers who 
arrived in the Marianas were in fact convicts, or forzados. In 1681 Fray Solorzano described the 
garrison in Guam as ‘Spanish in name only and their customs are effeminate, soft and ineffective. ... 
[They are] rogues who are made up of exiles from New Spain to the Philippines because in that very 
large Kingdom they did not fit nor could be tolerated anywhere.’29  
 
In addition to the reliance on convicts from New Spain, the authorities in Manila also sought to 
supplement their force by recruiting Filipino soldiers, particularly from the province of Pampanga.30 
The use of indigenous soldiers in the conquest of other indigenous peoples was commonplace 
throughout the Spanish Pacific during the seventeenth century. One historian has estimated that up 
to 40,000 indigenous soldiers served in Spanish expeditions of conquest and pacification across the 
Pacific between 1575 and 1640, at times outnumbering Spanish soldiers five to one.31 Contingents of 
Filipino soldiers were also present in most of the major Philippines presidios.32 The Jesuit 
missionaries in the Marianas were keen to continue this reliance on indigenous Filipino soldiers, 
since loyal Filipinos were seen to present a good example to the Chamorro population and could act 
as conduits for the missionaries.  Throughout the early 1680s, the Jesuits held out hope that the 
Governor of the Philippines would comply with a request sent by the King to dispatch 200 
Pampangan soldiers to the Marianas; however, these reinforcements were not forthcoming.33 Yet, 
while Filipino recruits were widely considered to be loyal and valiant soldiers, their situation as 
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colonised subjects of the Spanish Crown could nonetheless be destabilising in the context of 
indigenous rebellionviolence, as will be seen shortly. 
 
The Marianas mission became a crucible of soldier discontent during the 1680s. Set at a distance of 
more than two thousand kilometres from Manila, the Guam presidio suffered from chronic 
shortages in supplies. Moreover, the royal officials in charge of the presidio were notoriously corrupt 
and abusive, sowing the seeds of disaffection through exploitation and the hoarding of supplies. 
Because many of the soldiers serving in Guam were involuntary recruits, these factors combined 
were enough to promote mutiny. The fledgling Spanish colony in the Marianas was rocked by mutiny 
seven times in the 1680s, beginning with two shipboard mutinies in 1680 and 1683 that prevented 
supplies from arriving in Guam from Manila, and ending with a dramatic convict conspiracy in 
1690.34 The most successful of these events happened in 1688, when a group of mutineers led by a 
forzado captain took control of the island of Guam for a period of three months. Yet, the discontent 
that boiled over in 1688 has its origins in the events surrounding the Chamorro uprising of 1684, 
when, in the context of an ongoing indigenous campaign of resistance toagainst Spanish 
colonisation, the actions of the mutinous soldiers placed the project of empire building in serious 
peril.  
 
 
Mutiny in the Context of Indigenous RebellionResistance/Violence: Guam, 1684 
In June 1684, the indigenous ChamorrosChamorro of the Mariana Islands staged a major uprising 
against Spanish conquest. Intent on driving out the Jesuit missionaries and the Spanish officials, the 
resisting ChamorrosChamorro forced the entire Spanish population on the main island of Guam to 
barricade themselves in the fort at Hagatna. While some ChamorrosChamorro fought as allies of the 
Spanish, the garrison and mission were surrounded by a sufficient number of resisting 
ChamorrosChamorro to remain besieged in the fort for nearly six months. The uprising was centred 
on the island of Guam and took place within the context of ongoing attempts to spread Spanish 
control northwards to the other islands in the archipelago. The immediate consequence of the 
uprising was the complete removal of Spanish forces from the northern islands, the decimation of 
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the Spanish garrison in Guam itself, and the flight of more than two-thirds of the indigenous 
population of Guam to neighbouring islands not under Spanish control.35 The uprising also impelled 
the authorities in the Philippines and Spain to bolster the military power of the Marianas outpost, 
allowing the Spanish to completely crush the Chamorro resistance a decade later.36 
 
The 1684 Chamorro uprising has thus been remembered as a turning point in the history of Spanish 
colonisation in the archipelago. In the words of one recent historian, it was the outcome of an 
‘intense campaign of pacification, conversion and extermination’ in Guam.37  Yet, the records of the 
event also tell a story of military leaders who struggled to maintain the loyalty of their soldiers while 
under siege by thousands of hostile ChamorrosChamorro. The seventy-five soldiers inside the 
Hagatna fort knew only too well how weak their defences were.38 Moreover, Governor Esplana, their 
military commander, hesitated in actively engaging the ChamorrosChamorro in open warfare. As 
they sat and languished inside the fort for six long months, many of the soldiers found their loyalty 
to the colonial project failing. Some spoke of outright mutiny, while others discovered that they held 
greater solidarity with the besieging ChamorrosChamorro than with their own leadership. 
Ultimately, there is another side to the known history of the 1684 uprising, which highlights the 
limitations of Spanish control not only over indigenous populations, but over their own forces.  
 
The uprising of 1684 took place after nearly two decades of ongoing resistance opposition by 
ChamorrosChamorro to the Spanish presence in their islands. The rebels warriors chose a moment 
when the Spanish garrison in Guam was depleted due to an expeditionary force that had been sent 
to try to pacify the northern islands. Thus in June of that year, forty ChamorrosChamorro on the 
island of Guam rose up and attacked the main Spanish town of Hagatna, with the intention of killing 
the governor, the Jesuit friars and any other Spaniard who got in their way.39 The initial instigators of 
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the uprising were four assailants who attacked Governor Esplana in the middle of the street, badly 
wounding him and leaving him for dead. At the same time, another group went in search of the 
Jesuits, killing two and wounding four. Later the same afternoon a large group of 
ChamorrosChamorro entered the main church in Hagatna and a stand-off occurred between them 
and the soldiers who were attempting to defend the Jesuit friar inside. As the rebellion violence 
uprising spread across the island of Guam, a Spanish-aligned Chamorro man called Ignacio Ineti 
raised a force of fifty allies and came to help the garrison defend against the insurgents. Nineteen 
soldiers were injured during the ensuing skirmishes; however the badly wounded Governor refused 
to retaliate and instead issued ordered a retreat back to the safety of the fort. The surviving Spanish 
forces and the Jesuits were effectively imprisoned within this fort for the next six months, ceding 
control of the island to the resisting hostile ChamorrosChamorro. After the first bloody battles at the 
beginning of the uprising, the rebellion conflict took on the nature of a war of attrition, wherein the 
insurgents interchanged between taunting and baiting the besieged Spanish garrison and stealing 
their crops in an attempt to starve them out of their stronghold. 
 
As the siege continued, every day seemed to bring the beleaguered garrison in Hagatna closer to 
outright mutiny. The entire Spanish population of Guam – comprising a handful of soldiers and Jesuit 
missionaries – were beset by Governor Esplana’s unwillingness to lead his troops against the 
attackers. Whether out of resignation, fear or merely because he was badly wounded, Esplana 
rejected any suggestion made by the increasingly frustrated Jesuits to treat with the 
ChamorrosChamorro. In the meantime, the garrison became restless and disaffected and rumours 
spread across the camp that a number of the soldiers were thinking of deserting.40 Governor Esplana 
did not help matters by putting the men to work at raising the walls of the fort to strengthen their 
defences. The Jesuit Fray Bouwens wrote that  
 
The men were worn out with labours that were sensible under the circumstances in 
constructing and taking apart watchtowers and other tasks, without any more 
sustenance than a little bit of corn, [and] they lacked the time to cook it for their 
lunch or dinner: exhausted they would return to work ... with an empty stomach 
[and labour] from the break of day until twelve and from two until sunset. ... The 
men were bored by such indispensable labour and they began to mutter, showing 
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signs of mutiny: fortunately I and others heard them say clearly that it would be 
better to finish with them once and for all than to be killed from overwork and 
hunger. Others threatened to flee to the enemy, assured of finding greater rest and 
better treatment.41 
 
The Jesuits were concerned by this state of affairs, fearing that the desertion of the soldiers or a 
seemingly inevitable mutiny amongst them would lead to the final collapse of their religious mission 
in the islands. Fray Bouwens was compelled to write a formal petition to the Governor, entreating 
him for the sake of the survival of the mission to treat his men better.  He begged the Governor to 
‘please lessen the hours of labour as far as is possible ... and although the work will thus not be 
carried out so quickly, it will remove the people’s just cause for complaint.’42  
 
Significantly, while the ChamorrosChamorro maintained their desire to purge the island of Spanish 
domination, their attitude towards the ordinary soldiers was quite different. Throughout the siege, 
the attackers used a number of different tactics to convince or cajole the soldiers to mutiny and join 
the resistance, focussing particular attention on the Spanish and Filipino soldiers who had married 
local women. Mothers of these wives were sent to the gates of the fort with gifts for their sons-in-
law and a message to entreat them to rise up and murder the governor or at the very least desert to 
the Chamorro camp.43 Cleverly, these Chamorro mothers assured the Filipinos that they could trust 
the ChamorrosChamorro with their lives because ‘they had compassion for them since the people of 
the Philippines had been conquered by Spanish arms.’44 Eventually five Filipinos deserted and joined 
the ChamorrosChamorro four months into the siege.45 One of these soldiers reportedly sent a letter 
back to the camp entreating the rest of the Filipino garrison to abandon the fort. He wrote that the 
ChamorrosChamorro were ‘making ladders to climb the walls at the hour of prayers or at daybreak 
and it would be better to leave beforehand. There is no need to distrust the enemy Indios; because 
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all of them in general say that that those who leave the fort will be recognised as children of the 
land.’46  
 
The Jesuits were alarmed by the rumours of impending desertion and mutiny amongst the soldiers, 
distrusting the Filipinos in particular. Fray Bouwens wrote that the Filipinos were known to be 
treacherous and that throughout the period of enclosure in the fort they were sowing the seeds of 
rebellion and discontent amongst the entire garrison.47 Fray Kuklein wrote that the Jesuits were so 
fearful of the internal treachery of these soldiers and their designs on the life of the Governor that 
they ‘undertook to guard [Governor Esplana], telling the soldiers that we wanted to relieve them of 
the heavy burden of so many watch duties.’48  
 
The Chamorro siege may well have succeeded had it not been for Sergeant Major Quiroga, who was 
at that time leading a secondary group of twenty-five Spanish soldiers in a mission of ‘pacification’ 
across the northern islands of Saipan and Tinian. This was in fact where most of the fighting 
occurred.  Cut off from the main garrison, Quiroga and his forces found themselves surrounded by 
resisting ChamorrosChamorro as the uprising violence spread across the archipelago. They were 
consequently forced to quell the uprising in the northern islands before they could return to Guam.49 
When Quiroga returned to Hagatna in November 1684, news of his exploits on the islands of Saipan 
and Tinian travelled before him, and the insurgents on Guam melted away before his forces, leaving 
the town of Hagatna in the hands of the Spanish once again. Nevertheless, many of the 
ChamorrosChamorro continued their resistance by deserting the island of Guam and refusing to live 
under the Spanish yoke.50 In effect, despite proud reports of Quiroga’s successes in quelling the 
uprising in the northern islands, the Spanish lost control of the rest of the archipelago and remained 
in reduced numbers in Guam for the next decade until Quiroga launched another expedition to 
pacify and reduce the populations of the northern islands in 1695.51 
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At the same time, although Quiroga’s successful entrance into Hagatna in 1684 put an end to the 
immediate cause for discontent and disloyalty amongst the soldiers, the events of the 1684 uprising 
had a resounding impact on the garrison. The soldiers’ experiences during the siege – of exploitation 
by their military commanders and of being offered the hand of friendship by those who were 
supposedly their enemies – were defining. Thus, even though the fear of being overcome by 
resisting ChamorrosChamorro was removed, the disloyalty of the soldiers continued to cripple the 
mission. Some of the reasons behind this situation can be located in the endemic corruption and 
exploitation demonstrated by the governing class of the Marianas. The isolated nature of the 
outpost meant that Governors of Guam could get away with a lot more than their counterparts in 
more centrally located presidios. Soldiers stationed in Guam were regularly forced to go without 
even the most basic of necessities, as a result of corrupt practices by governors such as Esplana. 
Such behaviour solidified the resolve of the garrison to overthrow their military leadership, which 
they finally achieved in May, 1688. 
 
 
The Soldiers’ Mutiny of 1688 
By 1688, the Spanish mission in the Marianas had not received any aid from either Manila or 
Acapulco for three years, leading to severe shortages and a lack of coin to pay the soldiers’ wages.52 
In response, Governor Don Damian de Esplana decided to set sail for Manila in February 1688 to 
petition for aid for the colony. On his arrival in Manila, he was immediately detained for having 
abandoned his post without permission and a lengthy trial was initiated against him. He was later 
acquitted, but while these events were occurring in Manila, trouble was brewing in Guam.53 On 27 
May 1688, the soldiers stationed in the Marianas mutinied and seized control of the fort in Hagatna. 
The leader of this mutiny was a Mexican born convict named Manuel Salgado.54 Implicated in a 
previous plot to mutiny, Salgado had spent the last nine months under the protection of the church, 
where he claimed asylum from the law.55 When discontent broke out within the garrison in May 
1688, Salgado re-emerged from his refuge to take control and lead the mutineers to the house of 
the interim Governor Don José de Quiroga, which they sacked, pillaged and tore down. The 
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mutineers then adorned themselves in the Governor’s military regalia and paraded around the town 
in a sign of strength and defiance. Governor Quiroga, who had fled to the Church for protection, was 
tracked down, seized and placed in shackles inside the fort.56 With the capture of the Governor, the 
Pacific outpost of Guam was effectively under the command of the mutineers and their convict 
captain for the next three months. 
 
Most of the accounts of the mutiny – written by Jesuits caught up in the events as well as viceregal 
officials who later reported the events to the King – emphasised the leadership role played by the 
convict Salgado. As a forzado sentenced to serve in the Philippines, Salgado was representative of 
the most disloyal and unreliable elements amongst the Spanish military presence in the Pacific. 
Salgado was described by the Jesuits as ‘arrogant, impatient, very restless, a gossip, spiteful, rowdy 
and always inclined to do wrong.’57 He had been exiled to the Marianas in 1685 by the captain who 
was then transporting him from Mexico to serve in the galleys in the Philippines. His example was 
later used by the Jesuits to argue against the ongoing transportation of convicts to the Marianas.58 
Yet, at the same time, the focus of the Jesuit sources on Salgado as an inherently criminal and 
disobedient figure who corrupted the rest of the garrison effectively obscures an examination of the 
soldiers’ motivations to rebel. As a convict, Salgado was presumed to bring with him a natural 
disobedience and disrespect for viceregal authority. Yet, as we have already seen, the mutinous 
nature of the garrison in Guam extended beyond the individual figure of Salgado, who arrived in the 
islands only after the events surrounding the uprising of 1684. We have already considered the 
context of ongoing indigenous resistance to the Spanish presence in the Marianas, which directly 
threatened the lives of the soldiers while also highlighting the disjunction between the interests of 
the ordinary soldiers and their religious and military leaders. What remains to be considered is the 
broader context of intense isolation experienced by the Spanish stationed in the Marianas mission, 
which opened up a space for corruption and exploitation of the soldiers and compelled them 
towards acts of desertion and disobedience.  
 
Like their counterparts in the Philippines, the Marianas mission was reliant on the arrival of external 
shipments of aid. Yet, separated from Manila by a distance of more than 2,500 kilometres, the 
Mariana presidio suffered from an extreme isolation from other Spanish outposts unmatched 
anywhere else in the Spanish Pacific. The mission ordinarily received supplies from passing galleons 
en route to Manila, yet the galleons were frequently disrupted by contrary winds, shipwrecks and 
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the simple absence of available ships. Throughout the early 1680s, the Jesuit missionaries proposed 
sending regular consignments of aid directly from Manila to the Marianas as a way of making the 
colony more viable and more appealing to soldiers and prospective colonists. Even with the support 
of the Governor in Manila, this proposal was difficult to achieve for a number of reasons, including 
the perceived dangers of the crossing – which was frequently beset by typhoons – and a lack of 
pilots and sailors willing to make the voyage.59 When the supply route between Manila and Guam 
was finally opened, the first several voyages were disrupted by mutinies amongst the crews.60 
 
Consequently, supplies to the mission were limited by unreliable aid shipments and soldiers suffered 
from a lack of pay, clothing and other basic necessities. Hezel and Driver have noted that many of 
the early Governors of Guam, including Esplana, exploited this situation to their advantage. 
Governors turned the supply of provisions designated for the sustenance of the military into a 
commercial trade, directly controlling the storehouse, where all of the supplies were kept. The 
soldiers were therefore forced to purchase all of their supplies from the governor, who in turn set 
the prices. One report indicated that some of the imported goods were overpriced by up to five 
hundred percent. In this manner, the governors were able to pocket virtually the entire wages of the 
garrison.61 The flight of nearly two-thirds of the Chamorro population of Guam in the wake of the 
1684 rebellion waruprising was also a source of increased exploitation of the garrison, who were 
forced to take on extra work in the fields on top of their military duties in order to feed the Spanish 
missionary population.62 In 1687, the soldiers of Guam were described as virtually ‘ragged and 
starving’ because of Esplana’s ineptitude.63 One Jesuit commented that the soldiers were overheard 
to complain that serving in the Marianas was akin to slavery and ‘worse than Barbary’.64 
 
Some soldiers responded to this situation by taking any opportunity they had to desert. In 1685, two 
Filipino soldiers willingly joined the crew of a passing English pirate ship.65 The most daring desertion 
attempt occurred in 1681, however, when two Spanish and three Filipino soldiers stole a boat and 
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set sail for Manila, washing up on the shores of Luzon some weeks later.66 Nevertheless, the 
remoteness of the Marianas archipelago made desertion both difficult and risky, prompting soldiers 
to turn to mutiny. In 1685, a soldier died from starvation and exhaustion while labouring in the 
fields, sparking a short-lived rebellion amongst fifteen of his comrades. This event acted as a direct 
precedent to the mutiny of 1688, yet Esplana proved incapable of heeding the warning. The Jesuit 
friars attempted to intervene on behalf of the soldiers and represent their interests to the Governor. 
The Governor listened to the friars ‘without uttering a word, swallowing hard for a few moments, 
and then ... [he declared] that he was too much of a man to fear, and that no-one would dare to 
touch him, for he would have anyone who attempted to harm him promptly garrotted ... [and] that 
he would continue to treat – or ill treat – the soldiers as they deserved both by deed and word.’67 
Promptly, the Governor arrested four men without conducting a genuine investigation. He placed 
them in a dungeon with handcuffs, and the rest of the soldiers quietened down. A month later, 
some of the men were released because it was found that they had nothing to do with the mutiny. 
 
Corruption and exploitation were not limited to Esplana, even though he was a figure reviled by 
soldiers and Jesuits alike. When Governor Esplana abandoned his post in February 1688, the Jesuits 
hoped that his absence would help to calm some of the problems confronting the colony.68 In reality, 
however, the appointment of Sergeant Major Quiroga as interim governor while Esplana was away 
only fuelled the flames of mutiny amongst the soldiers. Don José de Quiroga was invariably known 
as an excessively pious yet brutal commander with a penchant for imposing harsh military 
discipline.69 Fr. Solorzano described Quiroga as a man of ‘very good habits and known virtue’ who 
was nonetheless ‘hard of judgment and very self-conceited about himself and his things; he is always 
full of praises for himself and his nobility.’70 Solorzano believed that Quiroga over-inflated his own 
position, as if he were the Governor of the Philippines or Flanders, and that he believed himself to 
be incapable of making mistakes, and so refused to take council from either his own officers or the 
friars. 
 
As sergeant major and then interim governor, Quiroga thus added the imposition of brutal and harsh 
command to the soldiers’ experience of life in the Marianas. When Quiroga took over as governor in 
February 1688, the soldiers were angered when he continued the excessive labour regimen that 
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Esplana had implemented. Yet by this time, the soldiers already had a litany of grievances against 
him. In 1681, Quiroga was said to have executed two soldiers for committing the sin of sodomy. He 
was also instrumental in executing many of the ChamorrosChamorro involved in the rebellions wars 
of the 1670s.71 During the 1684 rebellionwaruprising, Quiroga instilled loyalty through exemplary 
punishment. Surrounded on all sides by hostile and resisting ChamorrosChamorro, Quiroga noticed 
the faltering resolve of his troops and decided to execute one of them with all the attendant military 
fanfare. This soldier was accused of having plotted to murder the previous Governor and of 
disobeying military discipline, and so he was shot. At the conclusion of this affair, Quiroga warned 
his men, ‘God has brought us here to defend His faith and spill our blood in testimony to it, if 
necessary. ... This assumes that all should abide by the orders of the military and to refrain from 
offending God, because I cannot but punish with death those that deserve it.’72   
 
By 1688, Bustillo wrote that the soldiers ‘were upset with Don Joseph de Quiroga ... [because of] his 
style of governing with such supreme haughtiness and severity and under harsh and barren 
conditions.’73 The leader of the mutiny, Salgado, had in fact made an earlier attempt at mutiny 
against Quiroga while he was commander of the Hagatna fort nine months earlier, which had led 
Salgado to flee into the sanctuary of the church. All of these grievances boiled over into mutiny in 
May 1688 and Quiroga found himself removed from power and placed in shackles. Significantly, as 
one of their first acts after seizing power, the mutineers sacked Quiroga’s house and emerged 
adorning adorned with his clothes. This was a powerful symbol of the subversion of power which 
also highlighted the latent discrepancy between the finery of military leaders like Quiroga and the 
poverty of the soldiers’ meagre provisions.74 
 
Horrified by these events, the Jesuits feared that the soldiers’ mutiny would spark another uprising 
amongst the ChamorrosChamorro and end the Spanish mission in the Marianas once and for all.75 As 
the months wore on, however, signs appeared that not all of the soldiers supported Salgado and his 
decision to imprison Quiroga. In the end, internal splintering amongst the soldiers – encouraged by 
the Jesuits – broke the mutiny. A rival leader emerged in Captain Nicolás Rodríguez – an ordinary 
soldier who had been promoted gradually to the rank of Captain through his loyalty to the project of 
colonisation within the Marianas. Rodríguez became the mouthpiece of the desires of the Jesuit 
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friars to restore order to the colony, which they feared would be imminently lost if the sedition of 
the soldiers was combined with continued indigenous resistance to colonisation. Eventually, behind 
the backs of the rest of the mutineers, Rodríguez was able to orchestrate the release of Quiroga 
from his fetters and arrested Salgado and three of his loyal followers. In return, Quiroga issued a 
general pardon to the rest of the garrison. Despite this, few of the soldiers were happy with this 
outcome; while Salgado and his three companions were executed on the beach at Hagatna, fourteen 
of the mutineers were sent back to Manila so that their discontent would be removed entirely from 
the Marianas.76 For his role in the dispute, the once exalted Quiroga completely lost the respect of 
his company and of the Jesuit missionaries, and his hopes of having his place as Governor of the 
Marianas made permanent were dashed.  
 
News of the soldiers’ mutiny in Guam in 1688 evoked horror from viceregal authorities across the 
Philippines and New Spain. The events confirmed all of their fears about the potential threat that 
soldiers’ disaffection raised to the viability of imperial expansion in the Pacific. ‘That the said 
government of the Mariana Islands could be in this condition,’ Viceroy Conde de Galve noted, ‘with 
an individual of the quality referred, who introduced an entourage of those that, through fear or 
necessity, followed him,’ was warning enough of the precarious nature of colonial projects such as 
the one in the Marianas.77 Salgado’s status as a forzado was particularly noted and observers as far 
away as Mexico suggested that the only solution to avoiding future occurrences of mutiny in the 
Pacific was to discontinue the use of forzados in the fragile frontier environment.78 By comparison, 
the Jesuit missionaries who witnessed and lived through the mutiny were much more circumspect. 
None of their accounts of the mutiny explicitly blamed the soldiers for their actions, with the 
exception of Salgado who is depicted as an unbalanced tyrant. Rather, the Jesuits gave a great deal 
of credit to the legitimacy of the causes behind the mutiny and laid the blame at the feet of Quiroga 
and Esplana. In the wake of the mutiny, Fray Juan Tilpe wrote of Quiroga that ‘through the supreme 
power that he had, everything was exposed to danger, and I hope that he will not endanger us 
anymore, because the lesson will be for nothing.’79 
 
Fray Tilpe’s words were prescient, for this was not the last time that the community in Guam would 
feel the shocks of discontent amongst the soldiery. Barely two years later, the next wave of mutiny 
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placed the mission on the brink of complete ruin. In June 1690, a group of forty or more convicts 
were rescued from a shipwreck just off the coast of Guam.80 Delighted by the sudden increase in 
soldiers, both the Jesuits and the Governor began to talk about the real possibility of using their 
newly found strength to conquer the northern island of Saipan. Alarmed at the thought of being sent 
into a violent war of conquest against notoriously hostile natives, the shipwrecked convicts hatched 
a mutinous plan to kill the Governor and the other officials on the island, as well as the missionaries 
and any of the other soldiers who got in their way. They resolved to wait until the supply ship was 
due to arrive from Manila, which they would then board and seize, killing all of the officers and 
setting sail for Peru.81  While this plot was said to originate amongst the forty convicts, the 
conspiracy finally involved a total of eighty soldiers, and it is unclear from the accounts whether any 
of these included the soldiers implicated in the previous mutiny of 1688.82 Fortunately for the 
officers and religious friars, the supply ship from Manila was delayed by contrary winds, which kept 
the ship tacking backwards and forwards off the coast of the islands for three weeks. During this 
period, some of the conspirators faltered in their resolve, particularly in relation to the plan to kill 
the friars. Eventually, a pair of soldiers confessed the entire plot to a priest, who promptly informed 
the Governor. Very quickly, the Sergeant Major of the fort surrounded the convicts in the middle of 
the night and arrested them at sword point. Over three days in September, twenty three of the 
would-be mutineers were executed. The rest of the convicts were kept in irons and later sent to 
Manila on board the supply ship, bringing to a close nearly a decade of mutiny in the Spanish 
presidio on Guam.83 
 
* * * 
 
The mutinies on the island of Guam in the 1680s illustrate how soldiers engaged in the colonisation 
of a new territory could reach breaking point, precipitating a crisis that put at risk the continuation 
of Spanish control over the Marianas. The soldiers of Guam were confronted by fierce resistance 
from the indigenous population to the Spanish military presence in the islands. At the same time, 
many of the soldiers married into the community, and their adherence to the Spanish empire – 
where it existed at all – was challenged by the need to defend the Spanish presence militarily against 
those who had become their wives, in-laws, neighbours and friends. Their own material conditions 
were characterised by deprivation, due to the infrequency and insufficiency of supplies from Manila 
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and Mexico, and exploitation rendered by cruel and corrupt officials. Finally, many of them had 
arrived in Guam against their will as convicts sentenced to military servitude, and their loyalty to the 
imperial cause was questionable at best.  
 
Mutiny represents the extreme end of the spectrum of the generalised experience of disaffection 
amongst soldiers in Spain’s Pacific presidios. While the story of the soldiers’ mutinies in Guam is 
perhaps exceptional for what it illuminates about the experience of soldiers over a relatively short 
period of time, these experiences themselves were not exceptional and were felt by soldiers 
stationed across all of Spain’s Pacific presidios. A lack of guaranteed loyalty amongst ordinary 
soldiers meant that Spanish authorities had to limit their plans for expanding territorial control. The 
events in Guam in the 1680s also demonstrate that soldiers could be uncomfortable with their role 
as conquistadors – whether because of the excessive danger of the project of colonisation, or 
because they found that their interests more readily aligned with those they were conquering than 
with their military commanders. Moreover, the behaviour of ChamorrosChamorro towards soldiers 
during the 1684 rebellion war uprising shows that the conquistador-conquered dichotomy was not 
always straightforward. Stories such as these challenge our understanding of the process of 
conquest and imperial expansion and force us to confront some of our most prevalent assumptions 
about who engaged in empire construction and who resisted it. 
 
Mutiny and rebellion amongst the soldiers of the Pacific – whether threatened or enacted – thus 
limited and mediated Spanish domination in the Pacific. Similar interrogations of the agents of 
empire in other historical contexts has led to deeper understandings of the nature of and processes 
behind colonial domination as well as a more nuanced picture of the people involved in these 
processes.84 For example, Emma Christopher’s examination of sailors on board the ships carrying 
slaves across the Atlantic in the eighteenth century revealed that even those who were directly 
involved in the subjugation of some of history’s most oppressed subjects could themselves 
experience degrees of unfreedom and oppression. Furthermore, these sailors were engaged in their 
own struggle for liberty.85 Studies of this nature in turn help to demonstrate that indigenous people 
were not the only subjects of empire and that resistance to empire could cross constructed racial 
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boundaries.86 Just as indigenous people could be more than victims, Europeans could be more than 
mere oppressors. 
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